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Abstract
Vehicle sales and road travel volume in China have grown rapidly in recent years, and
with them energy demand, greenhouse gas emissions and local air pollution. Aviation
and rail travel have also grown, while ceding a large share to private vehicles. What
path will household transport demand in China take in the future? How might it
interact with policies which limit greenhouse gases, and what are the implications for
energy use, the environment and the economy?
To contribute policy insights and a foundation for future study in this area, I under-
take a new calibration of the Chinese household transport sector in the MIT Emissions
Prediction & Policy Analysis (EPPA) computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, im-
plementing income elasticities of demand for vehicle travel and vehicle stock growth
based on historical data. To bracket uncertainty in the literature, I impose three sce-
narios of future growth in demand for purchased (air, rail and marine) and vehicle
modes. These are explored under a no-policy baseline, a climate-stabilization policy,
and with a policy that extends the emissions-intensity goal of China's Twelfth Five-Year
Plan-both policies are modelled as caps creating prices on carbon.
Examining the results, I find that trends in growth are only modesty affected by
policy continuing present energy-intensity goals, with small decreases in travel activ-
ity and energy intensity of vehicles combining for a reduction in refined oil use; such
a policy has modest cost and affects household transport less than other sectors. In
contrast, my results show that a stringent emissions cap has large impacts on vehicle
efficiency, limits vehicle ownership and general travel activity levels. Compared to the
no-policy baseline, a smaller vehicle fleet (250 million total, or 200 per 1000 capita).
Sixteen percent of the fleet is new energy vehicles (plug-in hybrid-electrics), while to-
tal refined oil use increases by 2050 to nearly three times its 2010 level. However,
these effects come with a reduction in total primary energy as the policy is introduced,
and large costs economy-wide. Chinese national and municipal policies include objec-
tives of promoting vehicle ownership and mobility on the one hand, and of reducing
dependence on carbon-intensive refined oil on the other. My findings illustrate that
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these goals are at odds, and offer inputs to policy design related to vehicle sales, public
transit, congestion, pollution and energy security.
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Chapter 1
Motivation
1.1 Introduction
Transportation is an important aspect of development. Human mobility brings access
to employment and income, goods and services, and the pleasure of travel itself; cargo
transport allows valued resources and goods to reach people where they live and work.
When developing nations and their citizens pursue economic growth and transforma-
tion as a way of improving quality of life, the past suggests that transport growth is
inevitable (Schifer and Victor, 2000; Dargay et al., 2007).
Among rapid developing nations, the BRIC countries-Brazil, Russia, India and
China-are often singled out for the weighty combination of their populations and
rates of growth; and China is foremost in both. China's government has aggressively
promoted economic growth, and in turn, Chinese citizens have spent their rising in-
comes and wealth on travel, resulting in growth in travel volume, energy use, and
emissions; and changes in the modes share for different means of transport which have
been characterized as faster, sooner and more simultaneously than the historical pattern
in the United States (Marcotullio et al., 2005).
After a period of rapid expansion in all areas, China faces difficult policy choices. It
is called to participate in global efforts to meet global greenhouse gas concentration tar-
gets, which are unlikely to proceed or succeed without its participation (Paltsev et al.,
2012). In response, its government has focused on the language in the original Kyoto
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Protocol that allows for "common but differentiated responsibilities"-expressing its
duty to continue improving quality of life for its citizens, even if this means an increase
in its total greenhouse gas emissions. And even were it not concerned with the effects
of climate change, the central government indirectly acknowledges that the rate of ex-
pansion-the "development of China's advanced productive forces" which supports the
"fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people" (Jiang, 2000)-is
economically unsustainable in its present form. Discussion of economic rebalancing sig-
nals intent to actively manage an increase in services as a fraction of GD1P while relying
less on exports than on developing domestic markets for consumer goods-including
household vehicles-to support economic growth. The Communist Party of China's
continued pursuit of a harmonious (Tit, hexie shehui) and basically well-off (/JN
J*, xiaokang) society depends on the success of this transition.
1.2 Household transport policy: challenges and evidence
China has achieved unprecedented rates of economic growth over the past 20 to 30
years. However, while aiming for a high level of income, it is also attempting to miti-
gate or bypass the higher environmental impacts temporarily experienced by develop-
ing nations during their growth (Geng and Doberstein, 2008). In any such transition
the sequencing of events has a role in shaping their outcomes. This feature appears in
the transport sector-high speed rail and air travel infrastructure are being built while
auto ownership remains at a fraction of the current levels in the United States, Western
Europe or Japan (OECD, 2012; Campos and de Rus, 2009). China differs from the se-
quence in those countries where automobiles were available before these higher-speed
technologies were developed (Schifer and Victor, 2000). Figure 1-1 shows both that
wealthier provinces are more highly motorized, but also that strong differences are
possible within the country and may be attributed at least in part to the effect of pol-
icy measures-for instance in Shanghai, aimed at mitigating environmental impacts,
that have caused a different growth path than in Beijing. The switch from low-speed
modes-walking, bicycles, buses-to private transport-motorized scooters, motorcy-
12
40000 60000
GDP per capita [CNY @ 2009]
Figure 1-1: Static income-ownership relationship for Chinese provinces as of 2009
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). Each data point corre-
sponds to a Chinese province, which are grouped into six regions. The
four direct-controlled municipalities are labelled; see Appendix B for their
locations.
cles, passenger cars, light trucks and other light-duty vehicles-that accompanies in-
creasing household income (Schifer et al., 2009) is occurring at a pace concomitant
with general economic growth. As a result, China has become the world's largest mar-
ket for new, light-duty vehicles (Wang et al., 2011), and its refined oil demand has
outstripped domestic supply. In 2011, China imported 56.7 percent of the oil it con-
sumed, a fraction that has raised concerns about security of supply and vulnerability to
rapid changes in prices (Xinhua News Agency, 2012).1
Rapidly growing energy use and emissions from Chinese transport contribute to
problems of global environmental externalities, wherein unpriced, common goods (in
this case, sources of limited resources and sinks for greenhouse gases) are overused;
'These national concerns, referred to hereinafter as "energy security," bear resemblance to the con-
cern of global sustainability (Kruyt et al., 2009). Security of supply concerns encompass the negative
consequences, such as price shocks, of high demand when supply is beyond the direct control of national
governments. But the extent and accessibility of global fossil fuel resources are beyond the control of
any government, so the interaction between high demand and total supply raises similar problems, while
not allowing some traditional, national energy security responses, such as foreign policy.
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but in major urban centres they are also giving rise to local externalities-traffic con-
gestion on the "concrete commons" (Coughlin, 1994) and local air pollution (Saikawa
et al., 2011)-which are familiar in developed countries. However, where Chinese pol-
icy is addressing these issues, it does so within a form of government and in transport
markets which differ from to the well-studied situations in advanced industrialized
countries-in particular, the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Due to Chinese
governments' capacity to act, including diminishing yet still significant willingness and
ability to employ direct management, and the relationship between municipal and cen-
tral government officials, policymakers are employing a variety of measures influenced
by foreign examples and aimed at a variety of goals (Chien and Ho, 2011; Brown and
Sovacool, 2011).
Given high uncertainty, there is a recognized need for continual improvement in
projections of transport energy use and vehicle ownership as an input to policy. Global,
computable general equilibrium modelling is a method which can be used to simulate
these trends while including the effects of growth in other sectors, and can also be
used to study limits on greenhouse gas emissions which may affect household transport
projections through prices.
1.3 Contribution and organization
In this thesis I contribute to the understanding of the household transport policy chal-
lenges and options facing China, and in particular their interaction with efforts to
address climate change through carbon dioxide (C0 2 ) emissions, and the combined
energy and economic effects of both. I do so with particular attention to alternative
futures in the evolution of demand for two types of household transport: own-supplied
or private vehicle transport, in which households buy and use light duty vehicles to
travel; and purchased transport, in which travel on buses, subways, railways, marine
vessels and aircraft is paid for directly. I apply a general equilibrium model that in-
cludes detail on the Chinese economy to study transportation developments there, and
their implications for CO 2 emissions.
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In Chapter 2, I adapt an existing CGE model to better represent increases in de-
mand for the two types of transport under China's rapid economic growth by including
price effects and feedbacks possible in a model of the global economy The model cal-
ibration is updated in response to data availability challenges and the structure of the
Chinese vehicle fleet. By modelling sectoral growth which occurs much more rapidly
than general economic growth, observations up to the present are matched, and I de-
velop three scenarios of future demand for transport and the own-supplied portion.
I develop two types of example policy in order to study their impact on energy use,
greenhouse gas emissions and transport demand.
Chapter 3 reports the results of these simulations. I discuss effects on the stock of
private vehicles with comparison to existing, non-CGE projections; on absolute demand
for refined oil and primary energy and energy- and emissions intensities of transport;
and finally the evolution of household budgets and general economic welfare with and
without policy.
In Chapter 4, I consider the context and objectives of current national- and municipal-
level policies focused on household and personal transport, and the dynamics between
these, in view of the findings from Chapter 3. The policy implications of future trans-
port demand and its interaction with types of climate policy are discussed, followed by
a statement of some worthwhile extensions and a summary of the work.
15
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Chapter 2
General equilibrium modelling of
household transport
General equilibrium modelling, when compared to econometrics and other sector-
specific approaches used to make projections of passenger travel in China, has the
advantage of representing the entire economy One disadvantage of a "top-down" ap-
proach is that sectoral detail may suffer. I make use of an existing computable gen-
eral equilibrium (CGE) model, the MIT Emissions Prediction & Policy Analysis (EPPA)
model, version 5, and add more realistic detail in China's passenger transportation
sector.
The purpose is threefold: first, to better represent the relationship of transport de-
mand and associated energy use with growth of the economy in a rapidly developing
country like China, by doing so within a CGE framework that includes potentially cru-
cial feedback and interactions; second, to study how climate policies could affect deci-
sions made by households to undertake transport activities which consume energy and
emit greenhouse gases differently, and finally to examine these two types of responses
in combination.
A description of the EPPA model is provided in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2 the
model is updated to match data through the present for Chinese household transport
in terms of sector inputs and rates of growth. Three scenarios of future demand and
three climate policies are developed in Section 2.3; full results follow in Chapter 3.
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2.1 The MIT Emissions Prediction & Policy Analysis (EPPA)
Model
EPPA is a recursive-dynamic, multisector, multiregion computable general equilibrium
model of the world economy Paltsev et al. (2005) give extensive detail on the previ-
ous version, but because of changes in the updating of EPPA4 to EPPA5, and because
the features and structure of the model are consequential in this analysis, a thorough
description follows. To enable a variety of energy, climate and environmental policy
studies, the economic accounts of EPPA disaggregate electricity generation, transport
and other energy-intensive sectors; include representations of current, advanced and
backstop technologies; and are supplemented with extensive physical accounts and
flows tied to energy-consuming and emissions-generating activities. In particular, these
include all six Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gases,1 which may be treated separately or
combined once converted to CO 2 equivalents according to their global warming poten-
tial, and also local pollutants2 responsible for air quality issues, human health impacts,
and other effects.
Sixteen regions correspond to either individual countries or groups of countries,
with EPPA5 using the regional aggregation shown in Figure 2-1. Within each region,
households provide services to production sectors using their endowments of labour,
capital and resources. In return, they receive income payments which are used to pur-
chase the goods and services produced. Fourteen sectors are currently represented as
shown in Table 2-1. Trade flows between regions are represented under an Armington
assumption, wherein imported goods are imperfect substitutes for domestic goods.
For projections, EPPA contains information on stocks of resources, with prices re-
lated to the marginal extraction costs. Population data from the United Nations' World
Population Prospects (UN Population Division, 2010) is used to model growth in the
labour endowment; labour productivity also increases with time. An autonomous en-
'Carbon dioxide, C0 2; methane, CH 4 ; nitrous oxide, N20; hydrofluorocarbons, HFCs; perfluorocar-
bons, PFCs; and sulphur hexafluoride, SF 6 -2Including sulfur dioxide, SO 2; nitrogen oxides, NO,; black carbon, BC; organic carbon, OC; ammo-
nia, NH 3 ; carbon monoxide, CO; and non-methane volatile organic compounds, VOCs.
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Code Region
United States
Canada
Mexico
Japan
Australia & New Zealand
Europe
Eastern Europe
Russia-plus
Code Region
East Asia
China
India
Brazil
Africa
Middle East
Latin America
Rest of Asia
Figure 2-1: Map of EPPA regions.
Label Description Label Description
CROP Crops GAS Gas
LIVE Livestock ELEC Electricity
FORS Forestry EINT Energy-intensive industries
FOOD Food products OTHR Other industries
COAL Coal SERV Services
OIL (Crude) Oil TRAN Transport
ROIL Refined oil CGD Savings
Table 2-1: EPPA5 sectors.
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010
ergy efficiency improvement (AEEI) in production structures represents trends unre-
lated to prices in the development and application of efficiency-increasing technolo-
gies, and other non-price effects which reduce the quantity of energy used to produce
a unit of output. The initial period in EPPA5 is 2004, which matches the year of the
GTAP7 data base which supplies the input-output tables used to generate the social
accounting matrix (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008). The model subsequently solves
in 2005, and thereafter every five years until 2100, although in this work my focus is
through 2050.
Capital in EPPA is vintaged, with some being retired in each period and replaced
with new capital of similar type but greater efficiency, or of an alternate type. For most
sectors, including electricity generation, there are five vintages of capital representing
stock that is 5, 10, 15 and 20 years old, respectively Under price pressure to alter
production technology employed, for example as a result of climate policy, vintaging
has the effect of limiting the rate of turnover of old stock (Paltsev et al., 2005).
EPPA is implemented in the GAMS/MPSGE software, a general-equilibrium mod-
elling subsystem to the mathematical programming language GAMS (Rutherford, 1999).
MPSGE transforms the model description into a mixed-complementarity problem which
is solved as an optimization problem. The solution maximizes household utility and en-
sures market clearance, zero profit and income balance, the conditions for general equi-
librium. The preferences of households over different types of consumption are bench
marked using share and price information in the base year, and are supplemented with
outside information and estimates of long-run income elasticities and substitution elas-
ticities of demand.
2.1.1 Household transport
To enable detailed, technology-rich study of household transport, Paltsev et al. (2004);
Karplus (2011); Karplus et al. (2012b) introduced a set of enhancements to EPPA5 re-
ferred to collectively as EPPA-HTRN (for household transport), but now part of the stan-
dard configuration of the model. The transport component of household consumption
20
Household
consumption
CT
Other goods Transport
& services
PO
Purchased Own-supplied
PDT VDT
New VDT Vintage VDT
Fuel Powertrain
capital
TRO PTOI
c~SO
Services Vehicle
capital
TSE TOI
Consumption structure for household transport (Karplus, 2011). Elasticity
subscripts indicate other consumption vs. transport; purchased vs. own-
supplied transport; fuel vs. powertrain kapital; and services vs. other in-
dustrial capital, and abbreviations for inputs to own-supplied transport are
given. The inputs to the vintaged sector are identical to those for new
own-supplied transport, only in fixed ratios.
was disaggregated as shown in Figure 2-2. Instead of consuming directly from the same
TRAN production sector used as an intermediate input to other production sectors,
the representative household in each region chooses a bundle consisting of TRAN sec-
tor output (which is comprise of commercially-operated freight and passenger-sector
transport)-referred to as purchased transport-and own-supplied transport. In order
to consume the latter, the household must either purchase new vehicle capital, or use
existing vehicle capital. New vehicles become vintage vehicle stock in subsequent pe-
riods. This structure allows for flexibility in the fuel efficiency of the vehicle at time of
purchase as governed by the elasticities in Figure 2-2, which is then fixed once the new
fleet is vintaged. Unlike other EPPA sectors, there are two vintages of vehicle capital,
new and used, given the paucity of data available to parameterize the fuel efficiency of
every vintage in every region. Finally, each type of vehicle powertrain capital is repre-
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Figure 2-2:
Symbol Powertrain Energy input(s)
ICEV Internal combustion ROIL
PHEV Plug-in hybrid-electric ROIL, ELEC
BEV Battery electric ELEC
CNGV Compressed natural gas GAS
Table 2-2: Energy inputs to own-supplied transport, by powertrain type.
Listing 2-1: MPSGE production block for household transport.
$PROD:HTRN(R) s:htrn-sigma(r) b(s):0
O:PTRN(R) Q:(TOTTRN(R) - XBAR(R))
* Own-supplied:
I:PHVTN(R) Q: (OWNTRNNEW(R) - (OWNTRNNEW(R) / OWNTRN(R) * XBAR(R))) b:
I:PHVTU(R) Q:(OWNTRNVIN(R) - (OWNTRNVIN(R) / OWNTRN(R) * XBAR(R))) b:
* Purchased transport:
I:PA("TRAN",R) Q:PURTRN(R) P:PCO("TRAN",R) A:RA(R) T:TP("TRAN",R)
sented by a distinct production function, which allows distinction between power-train
types on the basis of the input to the the "Fuel" bundle, as shown in Table 2-2.
Listing 2-1 gives a portion of the MPSGE code used to model the production of
PTRN ("Transport" in Figure 2-2). In a two-vintage version of structure used elsewhere
in EPPA5, a fixed portion of own-supplied transport comes from vintage vehicles, and
the remainder from new vehicles. Vintage powertrain capital (PHVTU (R)) has a fixed
production structure to represent the impossibility of altering significantly the under-
lying efficiency of the powertrain in used vehicles.
2.2 Data sources and representing growth to the present
In order to apply EPPA5 to a study of Chinese household transport, the model struc-
ture was adapted to better represent the relationship of household transport demand,
income and rapid economic growth. The work in Paltsev et al. (2004); Karplus (2011);
Karplus et al. (2012b) and like studies focused on the United States household trans-
port market, which is more mature, better studied, and has broad features not in com-
mon with the Chinese market. In particular, the U.S. displays roughly constant per
22
capita ownership, meaning that most sales can be related to replacement of vehicles
scrapped by current owners, or small changes in GDP (Greenspan and Cohen, 1999).
In China, on the other hand, a large portion of sales are to new owners, and per capita
ownership is growing. These differences warrant attention to the data sources and
modelling structure used to represent China and other rapidly developing regions, to
ensure the representation is as suitable as in the region for which it was initially devel-
oped.
One challenge in performing such physical account calibration of a CGE model in
China is availability of data. In the area of transport, OECD (2012); Euromonitor Inter-
national (2011) and International Road Federation (2010) each republish some series
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China's China Statistical Yearbooks without
adjustment and with limited detail on data sources and methodology.3 Another issue
is the great diversity of vehicle types visible on Chinese urban roads. Many of these,
including bicycles, electric scooters and motorized carts, are not registered or regu-
lated in the same way as cars and trucks, and so do not appear in the same statistical
accounts. Further difficulty arises from the fact that electricity use due to electric scoot-
ers and vehicles is, at the moment, not reported as a transport energy use quantity, and
thus not distinguishable from general household consumption, making calculation of
on-road energy economy for these vehicles difficult (Weinert et al., 2007).
The recalibration uses data on household expenditures on new vehicles and high-
way distance travelled per vehicle from Euromonitor International's Passport GMID;
and registrations from the International Road Federation's World Road Statistics (Inter-
national Road Federation, 2010; Euromonitor International, 2011). The process used
is as described in Appendix A.3 to Karplus (2011), implemented using the code given
in Appendix A, and the resulting figures appear in Table 2-3. Particular changes here
which do not affect China include the use of approximate values from analogous re-
gions at some stages of the calculation, rather than round figures.
3Additional detail about statistical sources is discussed in Appendix C.
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0.9-
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
I I II liii
Region USA CAN MEX JPN ANZ EUR ROE RUS
TOI 0.519 0.508 0.508 0.324 0.528 0.383 0.14 0.588
TSE 0.286 0.304 0.182 0.542 0.276 0.492 0.637 0.031
TRO 0.091 0.087 0.208 0.069 0.09 0.049 0.195 0.264
PTOI 0.104 0.102 0.102 0.065 0.106 0.077 0.028 0.118
Region ASI CHN IND BRA AFR MES LAM REA
TOI 0.45 0.346 0.14 0.449 0.383 0.337 0.415 0.287
TSE 0.138 0.12 0.463 0.253 0.115 0.188 0.235 0.375
TRO 0.322 0.465 0.369 0.209 0.426 0.407 0.268 0.28
PTOI 0.09 0.069 0.028 0.09 0.077 0.067 0.083 0.057
TOI
* TSE
TRO
iPTOI
Table 2-3: Shares of input to the per-distance cost of own-supplied transport. As
shown in Figure 2-2, the inputs are: TRO refined oil, TSE services, PTOI
industrial (OTHR sector) output representing powertrain capital, TOI in-
dustrial (OTHR sector) representing non-powertrain capital.
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2.2.1 Adapting to rapid growth in Chinese vehicle stock
Simulating changes in expenditure shares over time that are unrelated to price re-
quires moving away from the homothetic preferences assumption. Homothetic pref-
erences have an income elasticity of 1.0, so that the fraction of each type of good or
service consumed by the representative household is maintained even as total con-
sumption grows (Rutherford, 1995). For mature transport markets in the OECD where
per-capita vehicle ownership and travel demand are constant or have an income elas-
ticity of about 1 (Dargay et al., 2007), this is largely an appropriate structure.4 But
in a rapidly-motorizing region such as China where, for instance, annual automobile
sales are growing at a multiple of the GDP growth rate (Wang et al., 2011), the CES
consequence that expenditure on purchased and own-supplied transport-and corre-
sponding imputed physical quantities-grow at the same rate as GDP leads to output
which does not match observations.
The household transport sector as modelled by Karplus (2011) uses a Stone-Geary
utility function over purchased and own-supplied transport, 5 but recalibration of the
extra parameters provided by this formulation, even with a very high income elasticity
of household transport demand, is not sufficient to match observed growth through
2010. Therefore, after the general equilibrium is determined in each model period,
the reference quantities are adjusted so that China's total vehicle stock in 2005 and
2010 matches data from the National Bureau of Statistics; vehicle stock in the model
is calculated by assuming that each individual vehicle uses the same quantity of non-
powertrain (OTHR sector) input to own-supplied transport as in the benchmark year.
2.3 Scenarios and policies modelled
Combinations of three distinct scenarios of transport demand, and three economy-wide
policies on CO 2 emissions, were taken to form nine configurations of the EPPA model.
4Some evidence exists that spending on vehicle transport (Davis et al., 2012) and transport generally
is not entirely stable in these markets with rising wealth.
sVisible in the reference quantities (Q:) supplied in Listing 2-1.
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Figure 2-3: Projected growth of total vehicles in use (stock) through 2050 by vari-
ous studies. "Wang (JK)" and "(all)" refer to the projections from Wang
et al. (2011) using the Japan/Korea and all-countries panels, respectively.
The Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) Low-, Medium- and High-growth
projections are from Wang et al. (2006); others from Dargay et al. (2007);
A.T. Kearney (2011); Barclays Capital (2011); International Energy Agency
(2011).
The scenarios and policies are described separately here.
2.3.1 Scenarios of transport demand growth
As shown in Figure 2-3, forecasts of vehicle stock in China vary widely. Other authors
have noted that from the early 2000s through 2011 most studies underestimated the
rate of growth of the privately-owned vehicle fleet; projecting 2010 vehicle populations
of 47-54 million against an actual figure of 78 million (Wang et al., 2006; Chamon
et al., 2008; Kobos et al., 2003; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012). This
disparity is due primarily to the underestimation of new vehicle sales growth over
the same period. Studies also differ in the assumptions on vehicle fuel efficiency and
annual distance traveled per vehicle, leading to a wide range in projections of refined
oil demand and GHG emissions.
The variety of outcomes also reflects structural uncertainty: different models of the
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Household transport
2015 2020..2035 2040
Purchased
2045, 2050 (all periods)
Low 1.085 1.65 1.2 1 1 0.95 1
1.79 2.15 <- <-- 1.94
Medium 1.085 1.75 1.7 1 1 0.9 0.875
1.90 3.23 <- <- 2.61 0.263
High 1.085 1.8 2.7 1 0.85 0.85 0.75
1.95 5.27 <- 4.48 3.24 0.0563
Table 2-4: Share-forcing factors for household and purchased transport consumption,
by scenario. Incremental effect for each period in roman, cumulative effect
in italic; the cumulative effect given for purchased modes is in 2050.
relationship between household transport indicators and a plethora of factors reflect
claims about the relative importance of different causal relationships. For instance, a
Gompertz function of income (as in Dargay et al., 2007) or time imposes a technology-
adoption narrative: ownership before availability of a technology is effectively zero;
then grows at a parameterized rate until it approaches, asymptotically, some maximum
per-capita level, at which point it is said to have saturated. Alternately, Kobos et al.
(2003); Chamon et al. (2008); Wang et al. (2011) use a panel method, relating China's
adoption of vehicles to the historical trend in other countries, aligning series of annual
growth rates according to ownership levels, and averaging across nations to produce
projected growth rates for China-yet authors differ on the appropriate set and periods
of international comparators.
In the present and following chapter, the concern is not with resolving this structural
uncertainty, but with examining the interaction of growth with energy and emissions
policy, most importantly the effect of prices. Accordingly, the literature projections are
taken, as given, to bracket uncertainty in the Chinese vehicle market. Three scenarios
of household transport demand growth are developed which attempt to drive vehicle
ownership to the highest, lowest and average ownership values. In order to impose
these on the model, the same method of shares adjustment described in Section 2.2 is
applied. However, the use for 2015 and onwards is a projective use rather than one
based on history. Table 2-4 gives the share-forcing factors used within EPPA, as well as
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Scenario 2005 2010
an extra set of factors for the purchased portion of household transport expenditure.
These factors model an expectation that highest demand for ownership and use of
vehicles will occur under both rising total demand and consumer preferences which
shift away from low-speed purchased modes over time; so that a future with the highest
demand for vehicles can be expected to also have a depressed share for low-speed
purchased modes (Meyer et al., 2007; Schafer et al., 2009). More comment on this
assumption is given in Section 2.4.
2.3.2 Greenhouse gas emission policies
The base policy for EPPA is a business-as-usual (BAU) projection in which no control of
any type is enacted on energy use or emissions. In the no-policy configuration, backstop
technologies are inactive.
A 550 ppm climate stabilization policy is adopted from Paltsev et al. (2012) wherein
each region, including China, participates in a C0 2-only cap scheme designed to limit
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations to 550 parts per million by 2100. The pol-
icy begins in 2020 and follows the same trajectory of percentage reductions relative to
reference in every region. No trading between gases or regions is implemented; China
cannot achieve its reduction target through abatement of the other Kyoto Protocol gases
modelled in EPPA.
This policy descends from the European Modelling Forum scenarios described by
Clarke et al. (2009) andis extremely stringent, much more so than any policy proposed
by China itself or suggested for it by others. However, it has utility from a methodologi-
cal perspective: by creating a large disruption relative to business-as-usual in the direc-
tion of lower emissions, it enables identification of the effects of policy on the house-
hold transport sector in particular, and of the differences between such effects across
the three demand scenarios described above. Household transport is not a source of
cost effective abatement opportunities relative to other sectors, so mild economy-wide
constraints result in reductions being taken in other sectors (Karplus et al., 2012a); in
reaction to successively more stringent policies, each part of the economy with a lower
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marginal cost of abatement will be engaged in sequence before household transport
shows any response. In short, the purpose of studying this policy is to make readily
apparent the distinctions from the counterfactual.
Finally, a FYP emissions-intensity policy extends, through 2050, China's commitment
in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (12-FYP, 2011-2015 inclusive) to a 17 percent reduction
in the CO 2 emissions intensity of GDP, or a reduction of 3.66 percent per year on av-
erage. In each subsequent period, the emissions per unit GDP are constrained to be
17 percent less than in the previous period, as follows. First, the business-as-usual
intensity is calculated for 2010. Then, for 2015 and subsequent periods, a target in-
tensity after successive 17 percent reductions is calculated. The resulting intensities
for each period are multiplied by business-as-usual GDP projections to yield total CO 2
emissions, which are implemented in EPPA as caps.
The purpose of modelling such a policy is to implement a cap on emissions which
has some actual effect on the economy, including possibly household transport, yet
bears resemblance to previous, current and aspirational goals actually stated by the
Chinese government. In international discussions, China has announced an intent to
cut energy intensity 40 to 45 percent in the period 2005-2020 (Casey and Koleski,
2011). With the achievement of a 19 percent reduction in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan
(11-FYl? 2006-2010 inclusive) (Deutsche Bank, 2011) and assuming the FYP12 target
is met, this leaves a reduction of 11 to 18 percent to be made in the Thirteenth Five-Year
Plan period (2016-2020 inclusive). Extrapolation of the 17 percent target to 13-FYP
is within these bounds; the FYP extension policy simply assumes continual renewal of
the same target through a hypothetical 19-FYP in 2046-2050.
The maximum amounts of carbon dioxide emissions mandated in each policy are
shown in Table 2-5, as well, for comparison, the unconstrained amounts in the refer-
ence scenario and in the model before the adjustment to observed vehicle stock growth
described in this chapter.
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CO 2 emissions [Tg = 106 t]
Year Unadjusted Reference FYP Stabilization
2004 5074 5074 5074 5074
2005 4823 4842 4842 4842
2010 7871 8051 8049 8049
2015 9672 10178 10174 10174
2020 11311 12042 11139 3871
2025 12703 13702 13076 3592
2030 13874 15108 14044 3308
2035 15093 16611 14528 3149
2040 15539 17198 14043 2907
2045 15894 17607 14043 2664
2050 15990 17829 13559 2422
Table 2-5: China CO2 emissions, all sources, in the reference run in the medium-
demand scenario, and under two policies modelled. "Unadjusted" column
gives the business-as-usual or reference quantity in the model as configure
prior to the model updates described in Section 2.2.
2.4 Extensions
The following potential extensions of the work would offer further improvement. EPPA
has been used to study transport in the aviation sector (Winchester et al., 2011), and a
parallel version to EPPA-HTRN has been developed which disaggregates civil aviation
from household purchased transport (labelled EPPA-A, Gillespie, 2011). Historical data
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012) show passenger aviation growing in
China in an absolute sense, albeit with a small share of overall travel. The analysis of
Schafer (2006) places this within a trend of shifts from lower- to higher-speed modes
with increasing income. However, as noted in Section 2.3, the consumption structure
for household transport used here allows only relative share changes between own-
supplied (private vehicle) travel and a bundle including all other purchased modes,
including aviation. Civil aviation, high speed rail, conventional rail, city buses, subways
and other purchased modes differ greatly in their per-distance price and energy and
emissions intensity. Applying the methodology of this chapter to a model with the
combined features of EPPA-A and EPPA-HTRN would allow modelling a three- instead
of two-way mode split to separate movement from low-speed purchased transport to
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own-supplied transport on the one hand, and simultaneous shifts or concurrent growth
in own-supplied transport and higher-speed purchased modes, namely aviation, on the
other hand. As well, more sophisticated scenario design could be pursued which would
capture shifts not possible in EPPA5 alone.
The Five-Year Plan extension policy used here is modelled as absolute emissions
caps calculated a priori from decreasing emissions intensity values and the GDP fig-
ures for the business-as-usual case. If the model solution GDP in a period is less than
business-as-usual-as is the case here-then the cap allows a slightly greater emissions
intensity than the one used in the calculation. This effect compounds over periods.
Because, as noted, the FYP policy is lenient, this error is not large; an average of 16
percent energy intensity reduction is achieved in each five-year period from 2015 to
2050. However, the error could be limited by altering the model structure to calculate
the next-period cap from each period's GDP and emissions outputs; or better still, to
constrain intensity directly
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Chapter 3
Results: Effects of rising passenger
transport demand and policy
This chapter examines the outcomes of the application of the model with new China
transport sector detail and scenario and policy modelling described in Chapter 2. The
presentation is organized in three sections: Section 3.1 deals with the own-supplied
household transport sector and private vehicles specifically, Section 3.2 concerns en-
ergy and emissions quantities and prices; and Section 3.3 with aggregate travel and
economic behaviour, including quantities of travel by mode, aggregate consumption
and expenditures on transport. Within each section, the distinctions between the low-,
medium- and high demand scenarios under business-as-usual are discussed, as well as
the impacts of the two policies, and followed by any important differences between the
model response to each policy, across scenarios.
In interpreting the projection outcomes, it is important to note that the model up-
date for China described in Chapter 2 and absence of policy before 2015 mean that
results from the 2005 and 2010 model periods cannot be regarded as predictive. The
salience of results under the Five-Year Plan extension policy depends on the central
government's willingness continue specifying targets, like those in 12-FYP that are
intensity-based and only constrain activity (including transport) slightly. Although the
results of the 550 ppm climate stabilization policy will be shown to be dramatic, this
is one example of the effects of absolute, rather than intensity-based targets-the type
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that must be applied to total emissions to have a significant impact on the extent of cli-
mate change that is likely to occur. If China participates in an international agreement
under it which is bears a smaller share of the global reductions burden proportional
to its base-year emissions, the resulting caps would be higher and the effects shown
here would be smaller in degree, yet similar in type. Additionally, in several of the
plots there is a larger change from 2015 to 2020 under the stabilization policy than
between subsequent periods; this is because EPPA does not represent forward-looking
behaviour, nor is it constructed with the time resolution for modelling policy phase-in
over periods of months or years-it is focused on the long term. As noted in Section
4.1, non-binding limits and quotas are sometimes introduced in pilot programmes, and
only scaled up once details of administration and operation are resolved. For economy-
wide climate policy, this strategy would likely be employed, diffusing the sharp impact
of policy. Implications for non-economy-wide policy, specific to the transport sector, are
also discussed in Section 4.1.
For each region and each economic sector or subsector, the model solution yields
both prices and quantities in the base and each projected period; the product of price
and quantity is economic value. Physical quantities are reported according to the
relationship to price, quantity or value in the benchmarking process and technol-
ogy changes as modelled; where relevant, this detail is given before the results are
presented. Together, these physical and economic outputs, as well as exogenous in-
puts-especially the population forecast-provide some insight into the consequences
of policy action (or inaction) for energy, environmental, and economic outcomes.
3.1 Private vehicles
In Figure 3-1, a comparison is made between non-CGE projections of total private vehi-
cle stock from literature and the range of EPPA outputs across scenarios. The medium-
demand, business-as-usual projection reaches a total stock of 496 million in 2050, only
slightly above the low-growth scenario of Wang et al. (2006). The range between the
stocks in the high (530 million) and low (448 million) demand cases is 16.5 percent of
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Figure 3-1: Vehicle stock, by year. Range of EPPA projections displayed as a band
between the low- and high vehicle demand scenarios, with the medium
scenario as a solid line; overlaid on projections from literature as in Fig-
ure 2-3 (green).
the median value, a smaller range than in the literature. The countervailing effects of
high prices for fuel combined with low household income (explored below in Section
3.3) serve to limit the effect of the large demand for own-supplied transport in the high
projection, and fleet growth, while rapid and increasing at 7.9 million (in 2010-2015)
to 10.9 million (2045-2050) vehicles per year in even the lower projection, does not
display as noticeable an exponential trend as in other studies.
In a relationship that is visible across model outputs, the policy based on exten-
sion of the Five-Year Plan carbon-intensity reduction target has only a modest effect,
so that the projections for total stock under this policy (430 to 504 million vehicles)
substantially overlap those from the no-policy scenario. Until 2035, the difference
is less than 5 million vehicles in all cases. The stabilization policy shows the effect
of strong economy-wide climate constraints on vehicle ownership. Total fleet size
plateaus, reaching a maximum of 269 million vehicles in the high demand scenario.
The same effect is visible on a per-capita ownership basis in Figure 3-2. Although
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Figure 3-2: Per-capita vehicle ownership, by year. Range of EPPA projections displayed
as a band between the low- and high vehicle demand scenarios, with the
medium scenario as a solid line.
ownership continues to increase from 2045-2050, the Chinese population projection
used in EPPA has a peak in 2035, and a small decline population slightly outweighs
the increase in ownership to produce a smaller fleet under the stabilization scenario. If
the trend continues, the total vehicle stock peaks, representing a saturated or mature
market-albeit at a level of 200 vehicles per thousand capita, less than half of that in
current mature markets such as the European Union, at 475 per 1000 capita (Inter-
national Energy Agency, 2011). In the reference scenario, or under the FYP extension
policy, ownership continues to grow through mid-century.
Within this smaller total, however, the same high prices of fuel and efficient vehicle
capital make alternative fuel vehicles' more attractive, because of the option of us-
ing a bundle of (less expensive) electricity and refined oil, instead of refined oil alone.
Figure 3-3 gives the share of own-supplied transport obtained using the backstop PHEV
technology, which is available from 2020 in the model.2 The powertrain capital por-
The term used in Chinese policy is "new energy vehicle" (NEV).
2For comparison, Gong et al. (2012) note an aspiration target of NEVs representing 5 percent of all
new vehicle sales in 2011 was missed widely, despite subsidies.
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Figure 3-3: Fraction of own-supplied transport volume from plug-in hybrid-electric ve-
hicles, by year.
tion of expenditure on these vehicles is marked up as 40 percent more expensive than
the equivalent input to new internal combustion vehicle transport. No PHEV/NEV us-
age occurs in the business-as-usual projections, in which all backstop technologies are
disabled. Under the FYP extension policy, the share for PHEVs reaches just under 6
percent by 2050. With a 550 stabilization policy, a much larger portion-between 15
and 17 percent-of own-supplied transport is derived from PHEVs by 2050; despite
being a consequence of an economy-wide policy, this is roughly in line with the global
average under stringent or best-effort fuel economy standard targeting only the pur-
chased transport sector, which achieves a smaller reduction in emissions (Karplus et al.,
2012a).
3.2 Transport-related energy use & emissions
Figure 3-4 gives the quantities of primary energy from each type over time, in each
of the three scenarios and under the medium demand projection; Figure 3-5 offers
the same presentation for the low- and high-demand scenarios. The key feature of
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Figure 3-4: Primary energy consumption by type and year in the medium demand scenario, without policy (a), and under the
FYP (b) and stabilization (c) policies.
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Figure 3-5: Primary energy consumption by type and year, for the low- (a,b,c) and high (d,e,f) demand scenarios; without policy
(a,d), and under the FYP (b,e) and stabilization (c,f) policies.
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the business-as-usual projection is a sharp rise in oil demand-both as a share of total
energy, rising from 24 to as much as 33 percent, and in absolute terms, where the
2004-2050 increase is by a factor of 5.1 to 5.6 depending on demand. The increase is
especially significant in relation to its effect on demand for imported oil and exposure
to energy security concerns, as discussed in Section 4.1; refined oil demand has not
ceased growing in the period 2045-2050 of the reference case.
The FYP policy results emphasize the limited effect of this policy, while Figure 3-
4(c) and Figure 3-5(c,f) reveal a number of interesting consequences of demand for
own-supplied transport. When the stabilization policy begins in 2020, there is an
immediate and drastic reduction in total energy output, by 41-42 percent. 3 This ef-
fect differs across energy types. Coal-fired electricity generation, for instance, is an
emissions-intensive sector with multiple opportunities for substitution. In the low ve-
hicle demand stabilization scenario, energy from coal falls by 73 percent from 2015 to
2020, and in the long term is replaced by increased supply from next-generation nu-
clear, hydroelectric and other renewable power. In contrast, substitution opportunities
in own-supplied household transport are limited, and oil demand falls only 27 percent
in the period in which the policy is introduced, to a level 40 percent below reference in
2050.
While the impact of different levels of household transport demand on total primary
energy is small, focusing on final energy for transport allows the effects of demand to
be examined separately from China's large and growing coal use. Figure 3-6 shows final
demand refined oil (ROIL sector) use in the household own-supplied transport sector
as vehicle fuel. The reference and FYP extension scenarios, both displaying continued
growth, overtake the 2011 U.S. level of about 190 billion gallons per year 4 by 2020,
and approach or exceed twice current U.S. consumption by 2050. Other features of
the final energy projection are similar to the vehicle stock results of Figure 3-1, with
some differences due to the additional effect of investment in more efficient vehicles.
As a result, the FYP projection does not overlap the business-as-usual case as closely
3Such a decrease is among the reasons such a policy would be unlikely to be adopted by the Chinese
central government; to reiterate, it is used here to provide a useful counterfactual.
4U.S. EIA (2012), sum of gasoline and distillate fuel oil (diesel).
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Refined oil use in household transportation, by year. Range of EPPA pro-
jections displayed as a band between the low- and high vehicle demand
scenarios, with the medium scenario as a solid line.
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Figure 3-7: Refined oil prices, by year.
projection, with a slightly
demand scenarios.
The BAU projection closely underlies the FYP
narrower range between the low- and high-
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Figure 3-8: Average energy intensity of household transport, by year.
Similarly, where the vehicle stock peaks in 2045 under a stabilization policy, refined oil
demand peaks earlier, in 2040, at a level of 132 billion gallons per year in the medium
case.
Figure 3-7 gives the unit price of refined oil in real terms, indexed to 1 in the model
base year. With increasing demand under business-as-usual, the price doubles by 2025
in the high demand scenario; by 2030 under median demand, and between 2030 and
2035 under low demand scenario; in all scenarios the level eventually reached is two
and a half times the base year price.
The FYP policy has a small effect, mainly of increasing the difference between the
high and low demand projections in the years 2025-2045. The stabilization policy, on
the other hand, causes an immediate and rapid increase in price; doubling from the
2004 price occurs roughly three to seven years earlier, and the price reached in 2050 is
14 percent higher than under the FYP policy or business-as-usual.
Average energy intensity of household transport is displayed in Figure 3-8.5 The
5 Intensity is calculated for each of purchased and own-supplied transport through dividing emissions
by passenger distance travelled on each, then computing the weighted average according to distance
travelled.
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Figure 3-9: Emissions-intensity of transport, by year for the high-growth scenario, with
and without policy.
reference projection exhibits the autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI)
programmed into the model, with slightly higher demand resulting in a greater in-
vestment in more fuel-efficient powertrain capital even as total own-supplied transport
increases.
The FYP policy results in an improvement of five percent across cases by 2050 rela-
tive to the reference, or 15.6 percent between 2015 and 2050 under medium demand.
While not directly comparable (as the per-distance cost of transport varies) total en-
ergy intensity of GDP decreases by a much larger 70 percent across the entire economy
during the same period. The stabilization policy results in a significant improvement
of 35 percent, despite the fact that household transport is one of the more expensive
options available for emissions reductions.
In Figure 3-9, the mode-share weighted average emissions intensity of transport
is contrasted with the intensity of own-supplied transport alone for the high demand
projection.6 Without policy, and under the FYP extension policy, vehicle transport de-
creases in emissions intensity, but while the reference decrease reflects only the effect
6 Note that in this representation an assumption of constant occupancy for private passenger vehicles
is used to convert between own-supplied VDT and PDT.
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Figure 3-10: Trajectories of purchased and own-supplied transport, by scenario, with
unadjusted reference projection (green).
of AEEI on emissions, the FYP extension policy also involves the investment in fuel
economy just described. The modelled shift to greater use of own-supplied transport
(discussed below) results in a slightly increasing emissions intensity of transport overall
from 2015 until the end of the projection period, while the effect of the energy-intensity
policy is to effectively flatten this slow increase.
Under the relatively aggressive stabilization policy, however, investment in energy
efficient powertrain capital becomes an attractive substitute for expensive fuel, and de-
spite a similar shift in modes towards more emissions-intensive private vehicles, overall
intensity of transport continues to decline through 2050.
3.3 Transport volume and household expenditure
A notable effect of both policies is to alter the long-run balance between own-supplied
and purchased household transport. Figure 3-10 shows trajectories of mode share, jux-
taposing the total passenger distance travelled by each set of modes, beginning with the
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base year near the origin and progressing further away as passenger transport grows
with time. The unadjusted (prior to the work described in Chapter 2) reference trend
is also shown, to illustrate a hypothetical situation of "constant mode share" growth.
The position of the business-as-usual trajectories show their (designed) progression
towards more own-supplied transport than in the uncalibrated reference, and also dif-
ferences in final travel distance. The departure from constant mode share increases
over time, reflecting the growing stock of new and vintaged vehicle capital used to
provide own-supplied travel.
Under the FYP policy, the mode share between own-supplied and purchased trans-
port does not change appreciably, while total activity decreases; this is visible as similar
trajectories, shifted inwards towards the origin. Under a stringent climate policy, on
the other hand, the imposed preference for own-supplied transport cannot be met to
the same degree as the household budget share does not stretch as far when vehicle
efficiency improvements required drive up the cost of vehicles, and are not offset by a
reduction in per-distance fuel costs, as shown below. Total travel distance thus even-
tually ceases to grow around the 2025 level of the no-policy, high demand scenario.
The high demand cannot be met without a greater reliance on purchased transport rel-
ative to the medium- and low-demand cases, so the mode share remains closer to the
unadjusted model's constant mode share.
Figure 3-11 displays, for both sets of policy scenarios, the percentage change in
aggregate consumption measured as equivalent variation relative to the business-as-
usual value. Consumption is a measure of welfare, and change in consumption one
measure of the economy-wide cost of policy; however, some reference below is also
made to GDP (not shown), which includes effects of investment and net exports that
may be differently affected by policy, but follows broadly similar trends.
Before the introduction of policy and in the business-as-usual scenario, China's en-
tire economy grows at 9.5 per year on average from 2005 to 2010, and is projected
to grow at 8.8 percent from 2010 to 2015; consumption growth is slightly slower at
9.3 and 8.7 percent per year in the same periods. In the reference scenario the an-
nual average growth rate of consumption later declines from 8.2 percent in the period
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Figure 3-11: Change in consumption due to policy relative to reference case, by year.
2015-2020 to 7.1 percent in 2045-2050.
The FYP policy projection shows a very modest impact. The stated energy and
emissions-intensity reduction targets are nearly achieved without policy, and the addi-
tional cost of meeting them is small, reaching only 1 percent in 2030 and 2.2 percent
in 2050. In contrast, the GHG stabilization policy produces an immediate and drastic
reduction in welfare, about opposite in magnitude to one year of GDP growth at recent
rates, shrinking to 15-17 percent less than reference by 2050. The continuing large im-
pact makes the cumulative effects of reduced economic activity visible, with the high
demand welfare under stabilization policy falling progressively further away from its
reference value relative to low demand, reflecting unrealized growth.
In context, the median projection for China's 2050 per capita GDP under business-
as-usual is USD 18,531, between the 2011 levels for Bahrain and the Czech Republic;
under the FYP extension policy USD 17,736, comparable to Slovakia; and under the
stabilization policy USD 13,960, comparable to Hungary.7
Figure 3-12 shows the share of household expenditure on transport, for the own-
supplied portion and the total with purchased transport. Without policy or under
7All of the three latter are European Union members.
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Figure 3-12: Household expenditure shares for transport.
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the FYP policy, the travel budget share peaks in 2015 and thereafter declines slightly
through 2050. The peaks are at 10, 12 and 14 percent in the low, medium and high de-
mand projections respectively, each within the 5-15 percent range observed by Schafer
(1998) in other, already-motorized countries. The decline of 0.5 to 2 percent reflects
fuel savings possible with increased energy efficiency of transport.
In response to the stabilization policy, households are faced with a choice between
carbon-priced fuel or more efficient powertrain capital or to reduce demand for trans-
port entirely, all expensive options for providing the combined amount of purchased
travel and vehicles imposed in each demand scenario. Along with the effect of re-
ducing travel distance (Figure 3-10), the result is a further increase in the share of
the household budget devoted to transport, to 19, 22 or 24 percent of the household
budget in 2050 respectively, with the own-supplied portion alone taking 17, 19 or 21
percent of all income. Households are subject to a large price shock in this case as
the price of emissions affects their entire consumption bundle, and transport, as an
important good, may be a less economically attractive choice for emissions reductions.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions and discussion
The foregoing analysis has illustrated ways in which emissions policies representative
of current mandates and a long-term climate stabilization target would interact with
rapid projected growth for personal transport in China, in particular the demand for
vehicles. It shows the impacts of both demand and policy on energy, emissions and
economic activity, including transport activity. The continuation of current policies
would only modestly restrict demand for vehicle and purchased travel, but would do
little for sustainability goals, allowing continued growth in energy use and emissions.
An aggressive greenhouse gas stabilization policy effectively caps vehicle ownership as
well as total demand for refined oil, limits total passenger distance travelled, and has
economy-wide effects.
Insights such as these regarding the effects of future demand for purchased and
own-supplied transport will be received and used differently by municipal and central
policymakers in China, because their areas of concern, latitude and ability to adopt
instruments, and relationship to households differ. While the results of high Chinese
demand for vehicles-including congestion, local air pollution, and high refined oil
demand-are recognizable from other countries, differences in urban form and gover-
nance (Wang, 2010) may mean that direct adoption of policy responses from the West
will not necessarily lead to success.
This chapter considers the context of transport policymaking in China and the ap-
plicability of the modelling results. While they are not included in the model used,
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existing policies and the dynamics between municipal and national-level policymakers
(and between different policies of the national-level government) play an important
role in China, and are important to consider when interpreting model outcomes. In
this context moving to long-term policies that are effective towards climate stabiliza-
tion goals would be challenged by the lack of agreement on the relative importance of
conflicting policy objectives and creating conditions, if possible, where municipal and
state administrators act in concert.
I end with a discussion of interesting avenues for extension of this work, and by
summarizing the work in its entirety.
4.1 Implications for policy
In this section I discuss policies that have been implemented or are under consider-
ation, and the factors affecting positions of the decision makers involved, before dis-
cussing how these relationships might affect the prospects for progress towards more
aggressive reductions. I consider several specific policies affecting household transport
currently in place under China's central government and the municipal administrators
in some of its largest cities. National-level policies include fuel economy, promotion of
the automotive manufacturing industry and the growth of NEVs in particular, and the
response to the energy security concern of rapidly rising oil imports.
I focus on municipal transport policies from the directly-governed municipalities
of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing (Figure B-1 in the appendices), because
these are among the largest and densest in the world, so economic and environmental
externalities of transport are most acute and policy responses more advanced. Urban-
ization is projected to increase in China to 77 percent by 2050 (UN Population Division,
2012), giving rise to more than 100 cities of 1-2 million (Leaver et al., 2012; Loo and
Li, 2006) and many larger cities; the pioneering experiences of the current large urban
centres will be looked to for lessons in managing this growth, including in the area
of transport. As well government entrepreneurialism is an important feature of poli-
cymaking in cities: in an opening and globalizing economy, historical experience and
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peers within China offer few tightly predictive examples, so local administrators rely on
foreign partners (investors, government or experts) to provide ideas for policy (Chien
and Ho, 2011). In city transport, this manifests as parallel experiments with a wide
variety of transport policy instruments employed elsewhere in the world.'
4.1.1 National-level policy: promotion of NEVs and energy security
China's central government historically managed the automotive manufacturing indus-
try directly, setting up state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the sector, and later promot-
ing their cooperation with foreign partners through international joint venture (IJV)
arrangements. Objectives of IJV promotion include supporting domestic manufactur-
ing but also transfer of intellectual property and development of innovation capacity
that increases the competitiveness of the domestic participants (Nam, 2010, 2011).
As early as the 9-FYP (1995-2000), the promotion of NEVs has been a feature of
central government policy with respect to vehicles, encompassing promotion of HEVs,
PHEVs, BEVs and fuel cell vehicles (Gong et al., 2012).2 Objectives included avoiding
local air pollutions and "energy saving" (reduction in petroleum demand). Approaches
used included funding research and development; setting targets for adoption; fleet
pilots specifically sited in second-tier cities, and a variety of generous subsidies to busi-
nesses and households purchasing vehicles.
Commentators have long speculated on the supply side of the Chinese energy secu-
rity concerns (Downs, 2004), but note that the central government seemed somewhat
surprised by the recent rapid growth (Downs, 2006), which is projected here to con-
tinue unless stringent policy is enacted. Management of domestic demand as a means
to reduce exposure to import risks remains a major challenge for the government (Dao-
jiong, 2006), but one area of response has been the promulgation of fuel economy
standards (FES) for new vehicles, modelled on the United States' Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) system, with a parallel objective of encouraging adoption of
As experiments, these have had mixed success; for instance, Shanghai has tolled some arterial roads
and highways, yet with limited impact on congestion (Wang et al., 2008).
2Although the NEV acronym was not used until 2007.
51
more advanced, efficient NEV technologies (Hu et al., 2010). Karplus et al. (2012a)
highlights that, compared to economy-wide climate policy of the type considered here,
requiring emissions reductions to occur in the own-supplied transport sector selects a
non-marginal, high cost means of reducing overall emissions.
The identified effects of policy on the transport sector show that policymakers can
expect refined oil demand, in particular, to continue to rise without policy, or with
energy-intensity style targets which do not impose strict caps on energy use or green-
house gas emissions. Refined oil use accompanies strong growth in automotive fleets
and therefore sales, which would continue to help support the domestic auto industry;
but the policy conditions for large-scale adoption of PHEVs are not created without
the influence of high fuel costs under a climate stabilization policy, and the limitation
of refined oil demand-and therefore imports, and energy security risks-is not solely
due to NEV adoption, but also reduced driving.
4.1.2 Policy in urban areas: vehicle ownership, use and public
transport
In addition to entrepreneurialism leading to heterogeneous policies in cities (Chien
and Ho, 2011), it affects the policy objectives and agenda of municipal governments.
In an inherently conservative bureaucracy without political or electoral mechanisms
incentivizing quick response to public concerns, the main externalities of high vehicle
ownership and use-urban air pollution and road congestion-appear to be addressed
strongly because they directly impact the middle class to which many bureaucrats be-
long (Seligsohn et al., 2010; Seligsohn, 2012). For the same reason, although walk-
ing, cycling, and two-wheel electric vehicles are retain a non-trivial mode share in
Chinese cities (Peng, 2004; Weinert et al., 2007, 2008), their regulation appears to
be a less pressing policy matter; on the other hand, strong purchased transport de-
mand-identified here as continuing to grow rapidly through mid-century even under
stringent policy-is being continually addressed through rapid build-out of public tran-
sit systems both within and between cities.
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Although the policies studied in the foregoing chapters are economy-wide and
national-level policies, they show effects of limiting vehicle ownership, which munic-
ipal governments have been attempting to do directly. Policies on both urban vehicle
ownership and use and the support of purchased travel through public transport infras-
tructure are discussed separately in the following subsections.
4.1.2.1 Municipal policies affecting vehicle ownership and use
Two categories of municipal policies constrain vehicle transport: those which affect the
ownership of vehicles, and those affecting their use. To affect ownership, Shanghai has
conducted license plate auctions for over a decade which restrict the number of new
cars put on the road to about 110,000 per year (Feng and Ma, 2010; Luo et al., 2011). A
limited number of new plates are licensed each month; prices can reach as much as CNY
60,000 (Hao et al., 2011).3 Beyond limiting the number of vehicles, the plate auction
has other effects; vehicles sold in Shanghai tend toward larger, more expensive models
preferred by the richer citizens who can afford to win a plate at auction. This policy
induces some leakage as owners register vehicles instead in surrounding provinces
without auctions (Luo et al., 2011); however, these vehicles are barred from using the
main highways to enter the city during rush hours.
Beijing, in contrast, has recently adopted a lottery system in which no payments
are collected. Waits are long, yet the city still adds nearly 300,000 cars per year to its
population (Hao et al., 2011). In an explicit attempt to combine features of the Beijing
and Shanghai approaches, Guangzhou has announced plans for a hybrid, auction-and-
lottery system (Caixiong, 2012). Hao et al. (2011) give trajectories of income and
vehicle ownership levels for Beijing, Shanghai and the provinces, and also suggest
that, in the absence of policy, Shanghai's ownership level may have risen at the same
rate as Beijing's in the period 2001-2010.
Concerning household vehicle use, driving in Beijing was heavily but temporarily
restricted during the 2008 Summer Olympics, with measurable effects on quantities
3Much greater, for instance, than the price of the Chery QQ3 or Geely Meiri minicars, which cost
about CNY 30,000 each (Xi et al., 2009).
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of emissions and air quality (Wang et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2011). A vestige of this
policy remains, with one fifth of vehicles nominally barred from the city's ring roads
each weekday; however, this is not viewed as being strongly enforced.4 Anas et al.
(2009) show that while fuel taxes and congestion charging may be expected to have
some effect on vehicle use, ultimately this category of policy is less of a determinant
of congestion than the difference in ownership. Beijing has also introduced regional
standards for pollutant levels in fuels as a means of addressing air pollution without
restricting ownership or driving (Xin, 2012); and while other cities have studied re-
strictions on driving, few have adopted them (Yin et al., 2011; Hao et al., 2011; Suen,
2012).
Within the restrictions on ownership, however, are municipal exceptions and sub-
sidies for NEVs, some of which are additional to central government subsidies; these
are undertaken because municipal governments believe that non-gasoline vehicles will
contribute fewer emissions to local air pollution problems that accompany congestion.
However, in the present modelling results, adoption of high-cost NEVs is significant
only under climate stabilization policy which increases the cost of other driving and
fuel use (Figure 3-3). Also, while reducing refined oil use, PHEVs require charging
infrastructure and electricity. Transport emissions in Beijing are a major contribu-
tor to summer air pollution, but winter air quality problems also arise from nearby
coal-fired electricity generation (Sun et al., 2004). If these plants are to be used year
round-or, indeed, if additional plants are built-to supply electricity to private trans-
port, this problem would become persistent and more difficult to address. Similarly,
while biodiesel and other biofuels may produce fewer and less toxic emissions (Mor-
ris et al., 2003), fuel standards cannot eliminate these emissions entirely, and will not
address congestion goals.
Generally, when municipal ownership policies are contrasted to the NEV promotion
goals of policies of central government, these have almost directly opposite aims. A
direct effect of Guangzhou- and Shanghai-style restrictions in constraining ownership
is to lower sales of new vehicles; since the cities are also home to China's wealthiest
4Personal correspondence.
54
citizens, they are being discouraged from purchases which would otherwise serve to
support economic rebalancing for the "pillar" automotive industry (Steinfeld, 2008).
The central government has commented when use of revenue from the auctions ap-
peared to be allocated to non-transport activities, and more recently has suggested
that ownership restrictions are harmful to the auto industry, but to date has not inter-
vened against auctions (Jing, 2012; Zeng, 2012). If the central government chooses
to address energy intensity and emissions in non-transport sectors, and pursue en-
ergy security through foreign policy rather than domestic demand management, 5 own-
supplied household transport demand will likely continue to increase, and cities may
elect to pursue congestion and local air pollution goals through continuation of current
policies, exacerbating this conflict.
4.1.2.2 Public transit infrastructure
To meet rising transport demand, China's cities
have also invested heavily in their public tran- Track distance [km]
sit networks, which already include the first- City 2012 Planned @ year
and fourth-largest networks in the world; they Shanghai 425 877 @ 2020
are further planning aggressive expansions of Beijing 372 1050 @ 2020
subway systems at great cost (Table 4-1). Guangzhou 236 677 @ 2020
The large and expanding track length, dif- Shenzhen 178 348 @ 2016
ferences in fare structure, and feeder networks Tianjin 109 255 @ 2016
of bus and regional rail services affect the rid- Table 4-1: Public transit systems in China,
ership levels of these systems (Hu et al., 2010), by length (Schwandl, 2012;
which remain high despite passenger conges- Guangzhou Urban PlanningCommittee, 2010; Zhang and
tion having a negative effect on perceived com- Yang, 2012; Xin et al., 2012).
fort of public transport.6 In Shanghai, urban
railways take travellers unable to afford auctioned license plates and vehicles, sup-
5The policy constraints modelled here are not focused on energy security per se, so the EPPA results
are consistent with a scenario in which the government does not act to curtail refined oil use for energy
security reasons.
6Personal correspondence.
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plying one third of passenger travel demand (National Bureau of Statistics of China,
2012).
While early lines were constructed entirely by state-owned entities (SOEs), cities
have since used a variety of public-private partnership (P3) structures to construct and
operate transit projects (de Jong et al., 2008), from one-time, single-line arrangements
with one outside partner, to a structure now standardized for Shanghai in which at
least four separate aspects of rail extension are handled by separate government or
private partners (Yuan and Lou, 2011; Loo and Li, 2006). Growth in future demand for
purchased transport services that-as identified here-continues even with limitation
of overall and own-supplied demand under policy, will affect expected ridership and
revenues, and in turn local governments' ability to guarantee returns and leverage
private investment.
Further, Schafer and Victor (2000) note that the travel money budget in Japan is
stable at only 7 percent, due to the Japanese government's historic strong support of
the Shinkansen high-speed rail network, among other factors. If China's central gov-
ernment wishes to pursue energy or emissions targets which are more severe than the
current, intensity-based policy and set economy-wide caps on emissions, much higher
household expenditures for transport, as projected in Figure 3-12, are one result. How-
ever, China has also invested heavily in development of a large high-speed rail network
(Campos and de Rus, 2009), so the experience of Japan suggests that providing long
distance travel through non-vehicle modes is one option that may be considered to re-
duce restrictions on mobility-although China's greater area will affect whether such
approaches are economical.
4.2 Limitations and opportunities for extension
This work offers a number of opportunities for extension. As noted, energy security
is a major national policy concern arising from increased refined oil use associated
with rising demand for household transport. Projections of total demand under policy
scenarios such as those in Chapter 3 can be one input to a framework that models
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global oil markets, and can be useful for understanding long-term energy security risks
might change with reduced demand.
Returning to Figure 1-1, inter-provincial differences in wealth and vehicle owner-
ship are large, and as just noted the wealthiest cities of Beijing and Shanghai have
followed very different paths according to their individual policy choices. Even the
central government, in explicitly assigning provincial sub-targets under the 12-FYP en-
ergy intensity goal, makes explicit reference to differentiated effort between rich and
poor provinces in Zhang et al. (2012)-the Kyoto principle on a sub-national scale. As
urbanization continues, the gap between national aggregate household transport indi-
cators and, for instance, the level of motorization in the poorest provinces may widen.
Projections, analysis or policymaking based on national averages, or a static disaggre-
gation of national figures, may then suffer from the "flaw of averages" (de Neufville
and Scholtes, 2011).
This challenge points to the importance of extending the present analysis into a
CGE model with a more disaggregated representation of China's economy, to allow
representation of significant provincial, regional, or-at the very least-urban-rural
differences which may be obscured in EPPA. The China Regional Energy & Emissions
Model (C-REM) developed by Zhang et al. (2012) as part of the Tsinghua-MIT China
Energy & Climate Project is one candidate for this extension. C-REM mirrors important
features of EPPA while incorporating a sophisticated integration of disparate statistical
sources on Chinese energy, emissions and domestic trade.
To capture even richer regional detail, as well as allow for separate representation
of various types of small vehicles popular in Chinese cities, a further enhancement
would be to perform a top-down/bottom-up coupling of EPPA or C-REM to a transport
model calibrated on a per-region basis. This would allow representing the transport
response to urban growth trends that may differ from place to place (Nam and Reilly,
2012). Schafer et al. (2009) demonstrate the value of this sort of linkage in transport
projection and policy analysis, using EPPA and a MARKAL-based transport model; in
the Chinese case a discrete mode choice model might be possible, as data are available
(Jing, 2012).
57
4.3 Conclusions
In this analysis, I applied an existing computable general equilibrium model that in-
corporates technology detail and options for substitution in the household transport
sector, to the study of future demand for purchased and vehicle transport in the rapidly-
growing Chinese market. I adapted the model to match China's observed process of mo-
torization through the present, and further developed three scenarios of future growth
in both total transport demand and the shares given to purchased and own-supplied
modes. With this updated model, I applied two economy-wide policy scenarios, one
simulating the extension of energy intensity measures currently in place in China, and
one related to a global greenhouse gas stabilization strategy.
Comparing the outcomes with a no-policy case, I find that adoption of vehicle trans-
port demand leads to refined oil use associated with transport growing by a factor of
six to approach coal's share of primary energy by mid-century. Ownership passes 350
vehicles per 1000 capita, and total private vehicle stock reaches nearly 500 million,
with transport taking 10 to 15 percent of household budgets-levels comparable to
developed countries with higher motorization.
I find, further, that these trends are only modesty affected by policy continuing
present energy-intensity goals, with small decreases in travel activity and energy inten-
sity of vehicles combining for a reduction in refined oil use; such a policy has modest
cost and affects household transport less than other sectors. In contrast, my results
show that a stringent emissions cap associated with GHG stabilization has large im-
pacts on vehicle efficiency, limits vehicle ownership and general travel activity levels as
it drives household transport budget share to levels between 19 and 24 percent. Be-
cause of the rapid growth in transport-related refined oil demand without policy, the
transport sector plays a greater role in climate stabilization relative to previous anal-
ysis for the United States. Of a smaller vehicle fleet (250 million total, or 200 per
1000 capita), sixteen percent is composed of new energy vehicles, and total refined
oil use increases less than 3 times from its 2010 level. However, these effects come
with a reduction in total primary energy as the policy is introduced, and large costs
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economy-wide.
These results are salient to passenger transport-related policy objectives of China's
central and large urban governments, some of which I elucidate. Chinese policymak-
ers can recognize that the industrial and quality-of-life benefits of strong vehicle sales
are accompanied by large increases in emissions and oil imports, even with advanced
technologies available. A strong climate policy will likely be needed to have the vehicle
ownership- and use-limiting effects desired to reduce congestion and local air pollution
in cities, or the management of demand for oil imports, but involves acute tradeoffs in
both household transport and overall consumption. This work lays the foundation for
future work focused on further methodological development and the impact of a wide
range of transport focused policies at the regional level in China and on international
energy markets.
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Appendix A
Calculation of input shares to
household transport
Listing A-1: Calibration of input shares to own-supplied household transport.
from collections import defaultdict
from os.path import join
import sys
import numpy as np
from scipy.constants import mile
# Constants for EPPA regions
from EPPA import *
DATADIR = '/net/fsO4/fsO2-dO/cecp/data/' # Location for data files
YEAR = '2004' # EPPA5 initial period
opts = {'delimiter': '\t', 'dtype': None} # Common options for reading CSV
data = defaultdict(dict) # storage for data
np.setprintoptions(precision=4)
def region-data(var, region, report-missing=False):
result = []
missing = []
for country in rc[region]:
if country in data[var] and not np.isnan(data[var] [country]):
result .append (data [var] [country])
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else:
missing.append(country)
if report-missing:
print('{}: No {} data for {}.'.format(region, var, ' '.join(sorted(
missing))))
return result
def lookup(var, region, function=sum):
if r in country-regions:
try:
return data[var] [code [r]]
except KeyError as e:
print(e)
return 0
else:
return function(region-data(var, code[r], True))
## Load the countries-to-EPPA regions mapping
rc = defaultdict(list)
for country, region in np.genfromtxt(join(DATADIR, 'countries.csv'),
usecols=(0,2), **opts):
rc[region.decodeO] .append(country.decodeo)
del rc['EPPA5 region']
## Load parts of the HTRN database
DATADIR = join(DATADIR, 'htrn')
opts.update({'names': True, 'skip-header': 'comment'})
# Global Market Information Database. Quantities:
# * DIES -- Diesel/gas oil consumption 6[10 kg]
# * EXP-0 -- Consumer expenditure on operation of personal transport equipment
# 6 [10 USD]
# * EXP-T -- Consumer expenditure on transport services 6[10 USD]
# * EXP-V -- Consumer expenditure on purchase of cars, motorcycles, other
# vehicles 6[10 USD]
# * MGAS -- Motor gasoline consumption 6[10 kg]
# * VDT -- Car traffic volume 6[10 -carkm]
# * VDT-V -- Average annual distance travelled by car [km]
for row in np.genfromtxt(join(DATADIR, 'gmid.csv'), **opts):
key = 'GMID {}'.format(row['Quantity'].decodeO)
data[key][row['Country'].decodeO] = row[YEAR]
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# International Road Federation / World Road Statistics. Quantities:
# * REG-N -- New car registrations [0]
# * VDT -- Vehicle distance travelled per year 6[10 kM]
# * VDT-PCAR -- Passenger car distance travelled per year 6[10 km]
# * VDT-V -- Vehicle distance travelled per vehicle, per year [km]
for row in np.genfromtxt(join(DATADIR, 'irf.csv'), **opts):
key = 'IRF {}' .format(row['Quantity'] .decode())
data[key] [row ['Country'] .decode()] = row [YEAR]
# Miscellaneous data by region. Quantities:
# * VDT -- Vehicle distance travelled 12[10 miles]
# * ACA -- Total consumption 10[10 USD Q 2004]
# * Share -- Transport as a share of total consumption [0]
# * Fuel -- Total expenditure on transport fuel 10[10 USD @ 2004], GTAP
misc = np.genfromtxt(join(DATADIR, 'misc.region.csv'), **opts)
## Preprocess some data
exp-v = np.zeros([16]) # expenditure on vehicles
reg = np.zeros([16]) # registrations
vdtv = np.zeros([16]) # distance travelled per vehicle [km]
for r in range(16):
exp-v[r] = lookup('GMID EXP-V', r)
reg[r] = lookup('IRF REG-N', r)
vdtv[r] = lookup('GMID VDT-V', r, np.mean) / ( mile / 1000.)
# Adjustments in VDT per vehicle:
print('\nVDT per vehicle adjustments:')
print(' AFR from {} to 8000'.format(vdt-v[AFR]))
vdt-v[AFR] = 4000
print(' CHN from {} to '.format(vdt-v[CHN]), end='')
vdt-v[CHN] = 18200 * 1000 / 1609
print('{}'.format(vdt-v[CHN]))
for r in (BRA, IND, MEX, RUS, ASI, LAM, REA, ROE):
print(' {} from {} to 8000'.format(code[r], vdtv[r]))
vdtv[r] = 8000
## Calculations
# Capital recovery charge rate
crc = 0.09 * np.ones([16])
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# Levelized cost per distance
lcpd = (misc[:] ['ACA'] * misc[:] ['Share'] * 10**10) / ( misc[:] ['VDT'] * 10**12)
# fuel cost per distance = tro
tro = (misc[:]['Fuel'] * 10**10) / (misc[:]['VDT'] * 10**12)
# cost of new vehicles = expenditure on vehicles / # of vehicles registered
nyc = (exp.v * 10**6) / (reg * 10**3)
# corrections:
print('\nNew vehicle cost adjusments:')
# Adjust USA, CAN to reflect share of light trucks
print(' USA from {} to {}'.format(nvc[USA], nvc[USA]/2.))
nvc[USA] /= 2.
print(' CAN from {} to {}'.format(nvc[CAN], nvc[CAN]/1.5))
nvc[CAN] /= 1.5
print(' AFR {}, REA {} \n to IND {}'.format(nvc[AFR], nvc[REA], nvc[IND]))
nvc[AFR] = nvc[IND]
nvc[REA] = nvc[IND]
print(' ASI {}\ LAM {}, ROE {} to BRA {}'.format(nvc[ASI], nvc[LAM],
nvc[ROE], nvc[BRA]))
nvc[ASI] = nvc[BRA]
nvc[LAM] = nvc[BRA]
nvc[ROE] = nvc[BRA]
print(' MES from {} to RUS {}'.format(nvc[MES], nvc[RUS]))
nvc[MES] = nvc[RUS]
# Powertrain industrial
ptoi = (0.2 * nvc) * crc / vdt_v
# Total other industrial
toi = nvc * crc / vdt_v
# Services (residual)
tse = lcpd - tro - toi - ptoi
# Fractions of total
tsefrac = tse / lcpd
toifrac = toi / lcpd
ptoifrac = ptoi / lcpd
trofrac = tro / lcpd
## Generate output
with open('htrn-shares.csv', 'wb') as f:
f.write(bytes('\t'.join(code), 'utf-8'))
f.write(b'\n')
np.savetxt(f, np.vstack((toi-frac, tse-frac, trojfrac, ptoi-frac)),
delimiter='\t', fmt='%.4g')
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Appendix B
Map of China
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Figure B-1: Map of Chinese provinces, provincial capitals and directly-governed mu-
nicipalities. Adapted from the Wikimedia Commons file "China adminis-
trative PRC".
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Appendix C
Publications of Chinese transport
statistics
The China Statistical Yearbook is the flagship publication of the National Bureau of
Statistics of China. While these annual documents and accompanying data files contain
some glossary information on the contents of the tables, the NBSC does not publish
enough information about its data collection methodology to allow nuanced critique
or correction by interested third parties. In part this is because of historically limited
resources; with low capacity within the NBSC itself to dictate data collection practices,
it is reliant on per-sector provincial government agencies to furnish data, and these can
have mixed quality for a variety of reasons (Sinton, 2001).
As well, despite the availability of provincial yearbooks containing a variety of less
aggregated transport information not present in the national accounts, these are not
typically translated for a foreign audience, and so usually elude inclusion into English-
language data bases. One example is Sichuan Department of Transportation (2011).
Fourin, Inc. (2011), a Japanese firm, also publishes a China Automotive Industry Year-
book based on data obtained directly from manufacturers, but as a private effort this
is, again, not open to methodological scrutiny.
Close perusal of the data from NBSC itself show that the same points will change
from year to year, and at several points earlier data has been dropped from transport
series and not reintroduced, possibly indicating low quality and a lack of basis for
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correction to the current standard. For instance, the 2002 Yearbook omits previously-
published figures for passenger travel volume from 1952 through 1975, a period which
includes years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) (National Bureau of Statistics
of China, 2002, 2003).
68
Bibliography
A. Anas, G. R. Timilsina, and S. Zheng. An Analysis of Various Policy Instruments to
Reduce Congestion, Fuel Consumption and CO 2 Emissions in Beijing. Policy Research
Working Paper 5068, The World Bank, Development Research Group, Environment
and Energy Team, Washington, DC, USA, 2009.
A.T. Kearney. China Solutions. Presentation slides, May 2011.
Barclays Capital. BRIC exposure provides mid-term growth: U.S. autos & auto parts
industry update. Presentation slides, May 2011.
M. A. Brown and B. K. Sovacool. Climate Change and Global Energy Security: Technology
and Policy Options. Energy, Environment & Public Policy. The MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, USA, 2011.
Z. Caixiong. "Guangzhou to limit number of car plates," China Daily, 11 July
2012. Available at: http: //www. chinadaily. com. cn/china/2012-07/11/
content..15567125. htm, July 2012. Accessed 01 August 2012.
J. Campos and G. de Rus. Some stylized facts about high-speed rail: A re-
view of HSR experiences around the world. Transport Policy, 16(1):19, 2009.
doi:10.1016/j.tranpol.2009.02.008.
J. Casey and K. Koleski. Backgrounder: China's 12th Five-year Plan, U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission. Available at: http: //www. uscc. gov/
researchpapers/2011/12th-FiveYearPlan_062811.pdf, June 2011.
M. Chamon, P Mauro, and Y Okawa. Mass car ownership in the emerging
market giants. Economic Policy, 23(54):243-296, 2008. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
0327.2008.00201.x.
S.-S. Chien and B. Ho. Globalization and the local government learning process in post-
Mao China: a transnational perspective. Global Networks, 11(3):315-333, 2011.
doi:10.1111/j.1471-0374.2011.00328.x.
L. Clarke, J. Edmonds, V Krey, R. Richels, S. Rose, and M. Tavoni. International cli-
mate policy architectures: Overview of the EMF 22 International Scenarios. Energy
Economics, 31:S64, 2009. doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2009.10.013.
69
J. F. Coughlin. The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda, chapter
7: The Tragedy of the Concrete Commons: Defining Traffic Congestion as a Public
Problem, pages 138-158. Studies in Government and Public Policy. University Press
of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA, 1994.
Z. Daojiong. China's energy security: Domestic and international issues. Survival, 48
(1):179-190, 2006. doi:10.1080/00396330600594322.
J. Dargay, D. Gately, and M. Sommer. Vehicle ownership and income growth, world-
wide: 1960-2030. The Energy Journal, 28(4):143-170, 2007.
B. Davis, T. Dutzik, and P Baxandall. Transportation and the New Generation:
Why young people are driving less and what it means for transportation pol-
icy. Technical report, Frontier Group/U.S. PIRG Education Fund, Boston, MA,
April 2012. Available at: http://www.frontiergroup.org/reports/fg/
transportation-and-new-generation.
M. de Jong, X. Shanshan, and D. Stead. Applying public-private partnership to sub-
way construction in China: What is the evidence? In First International Conference
on Infrastructure Systems and Services, pages 1-6, Rotterdam, Netherlands, 2008.
doi:10.1109/INFRA.2008.5439595.
R. de Neufville and S. Scholtes. Flexibility in Engineering Design. Engineering Systems.
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachsetts, 2011.
Deutsche Bank. 12th Five Year Plan: Chinese leadership towards a low carbon econ-
omy. Deutsche Bank Group, DB Climate Change Advisors, Frankfurt, Germany, April
2011. Available at: http: //www.dbcca. com/dbcca/EN/_media/China_12th_
FiveYearPlan. pdf. Accessed 25 July 2012.
E. S. Downs. The Chinese Energy Security Debate. The China Quarterly, 177:21-41,
2004. doi:10.1017/SO305741004000037.
E. S. Downs. China. Energy Security Series, The Brookings Institution, Washing-
ton, DC, USA, December 2006. Available at: www . brookings . edu/f p/research/
energy/2006china.pdf.
Euromonitor International. Passport Global Market Information Database, 2011. Statis-
tics retrieved 16 October 2011.
S. Feng and Z. Ma. Performance Analysis on Private Vehicle Plate Auction in Shanghai.
In Sixth Advanced Forum on Transportation of China, pages 6-12, Beijing, China,
2010.
Fourin, Inc. China Automotive Industry Yearbook 2011. Fourin, Inc., Nagoya, Japan,
2011.
70
Y Geng and B. Doberstein. Developing the circular economy in China: Chal-
lenges and opportunities for achieving 'leapfrog development'. International
Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology, 15(3):231-239, 2008.
doi: 10.3843/SusDev.15.3:6.
C. W Gillespie. A General Equilibrium Analysis of Climate Policy for Aviation. Master's
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2011. Available
at: http://globalchangen.mit.edu/research/publications/2166.
H. Gong, M. Q. Wang, and H. Wang. New energy vehicles in China: policies, demon-
stration, and progress. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 2012.
doi: 10.1007/si 1027-012-9358-6.
A. Greenspan and D. Cohen. Motor Vehicle Stocks, Scrappage, and Sales. Review of
Economics and Statistics, 81(3):369, 1999. doi:10.1162/003465399558300.
Guangzhou Urban Planning Committee. "Guangzhou rail transit network in 2011-2015
building program publicity" (in Chinese). Press release, March 2010. Available at:
http://www.upo.gov.cn/pages/news/bjxw/2010/4602.shtml.
H. Hao, H. Wang, and M. Ouyang. Comparison of policies on vehicle ownership and use
between Beijing and Shanghai and their impacts on fuel consumption by passenger
vehicles. Energy Policy, 39(2):1016-1021, 2011. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.11.039.
X. Hu, S. Chang, J. Li, and Y Qin. Energy for sustainable road transportation in
China: Challenges, initiatives and policy implications. Energy, pages 4289-4301,
2010. doi:10.1016/j.energy.2009.05.024.
International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook 2011. OECD Publishing, Paris,
France, 2011. doi:10.1787/20725302.
International Road Federation. World Road Statistics 2010 and electronic files, 2010.
Z. Jiang. Speech during inspection tour of Guangdong Province, China, 25 February
2000. Transcript quotation, available at: http: //www. idcpc .org. cn/english/
policy/3represents . htm, February 2000. Accessed 10 August 2012.
C. Jing. Personal correspondence, May 2012. Associate professor, School of Economics
and Management, Tsinghua University.
V J. Karplus. Climate and Energy Policy for U.S. Passenger Vehicles: A Technology-Rich
Economic Modeling and Policy Analysis. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, Cambridge, USA, February 2011.
V J. Karplus, P N. Kishimoto, and S. Paltsev. The global energy, C02 emissions, and
economic impact of vehicle fuel economy standards. In 15th Annual Conference on
Global Economic Analysis, Cambridge, UK, 2012a. Cambridge University Press.
71
V J. Karplus, S. Paltsev, M. Babiker, J. Heywood, and J. M. Reilly. Applying En-
gineering and Fleet Detail to Represent Passenger Vehicle Transport in a Com-
putable General Equilibrium Model. Report No. 216, MIT Joint Program on the
Science & Policy of Global Change, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2012b. Available at:
http://globalchange.mit. edu/research/publications/2270.
P H. Kobos, J. D. Erickson, and T. E. Drennen. Scenario Analysis of Chinese Pas-
senger Vehicle Growth. Contemporary Economic Policy, 21(2):200-217, 2003.
doi: 10. 1093/cep/bygOO5.
B. Kruyt, D. van Vuuren, H. de Vries, and H. Groenenberg. Indicators for energy secu-
rity. Energy Policy, 37(6):2166-2181, 2009. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.02.006.
L. H. Leaver, R. Samuelson, and J. D. Leaver. Potential for low transport energy use
in developing Asian cities through compact urban development. In Third IAEE Asian
Conference, Kyoto, Japan, 2012.
B. P Loo and D. Y. Li. Developing metro systems in the People's Republic of China:
Policy and gaps. Transportation, 33:115-32, 2006. doi:10.1007/s11116-005-3046-
2.
X. Luo, Y. Hayashi, H. Kato, and Q. Sun. Passenger transport CO 2 emission and mit-
igation policies in developing mega-city: A case study of Shanghai. In B. Mao,
S. Yang, and L. Yang, editors, Seventh Advanced Forum on Transportation of China
(AFTC 2011), pages 248-255, Beijing, China, 2011. doi:10.1049/cp.2011.1413.
P J. Marcotullio, E. Williams, and J. D. Marshall. Faster, Sooner, and More Simultane-
ously: How Recent Road and Air Transportation CO 2 Emission Trends in Developing
Countries Differ From Historic Trends in the United States. The Journal of Environ-
ment & Development, 14(1):125-148, 2005. doi:10.1177/1070496504273716.
I. Meyer, M. Leimbach, and C. Jaeger. International passenger transport and climate
change: A sector analysis in car demand and associated emissions from 2000 to
2050. Energy Policy, 35(12):6332-6345, 2007. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2007.07.025.
R. Morris, A. Pollack, G. Mansell, C. Lindhjem, Y Jia, and G. Wilson. Impact of Biodiesel
Fuels on Air Quality and Human Health. National Renewable Energy Laboratory re-
port NREL/SR-540-33793, ENVIRON International Corporation, Novato, California,
May 2003.
K.-M. Nam. Foreign Direct Investment, Intra-organizational Proximity, and Technologi-
cal Capability: The Case of China's Automobile Industry. PhD thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA, September 2010. Available at:
http://globalchange.mit. edu/research/publications/2111.
K.-M. Nam. Learning through the international joint venture: lessons from the experi-
ence of China's automotive sector. Industrial and Corporate Change, 20(3):855-902,
2011. doi:10.1093/icc/dtrO15.
72
K.-M. Nam and J. M. Reilly. City Size Distribution as a Function of Socioeconomic
Conditions: An Eclectic Approach to Downscaling Global Population. Urban Studies,
2012. doi:10.1177/0042098012448943.
G. B. Narayanan and T. L. Walmsley Global Trade, Assistance, and Production:
The GTAP 7 Data Base. Technical report, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Pur-
due University, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA, 2008. Available online at: http:
//www. gtap. agecon.purdue . edu/databases/v7/v7doco . asp.
National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Yearbook 2001. Beijing, China,
2002. Available at: http: //www. stats. gov. cn/english/statisticaldata/
yearlydata/YB2001e/ml/indexE.htm.
National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Yearbook 2002. Beijing, China,
2003. Available at: http: //www. stats. gov. cn/english/statisticaldata/
yearlydata/YB2002e/ml/indexE.htm.
National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Yearbook 2010. Beijing, China,
2011. Available at: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2010/indexeh.
htm.
National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Yearbook 2011. Beijing, China,
2012. Available at: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2011/indexeh.
htm.
OECD. OECD.Stat database. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, 2012. Accessed 27 July 2012.
S. Paltsev, L. Viguier, M. Babiker, J. Reilly, and K. Tay. Disaggregating Household
Transport in the MIT-EPPA Model. Technical Note No.5, MIT Joint Program on
the Science & Policy of Global Change, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 2004.
http: //globalchange . mit . edu/research/publications/522.
S. Paltsev, J. Reilly, H. Jacoby, R. Eckaus, J. McFarland, M. Sarofim, M. Asadoorian, and
M. Babiker. The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model: Version
4. Report 125, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Cam-
bridge, MA, 2005. Available at: http: //global change . mit .edu/research/
publications/697.
S. Paltsev, J. Morris, Y. Cai, V Karplus, and H. Jacoby. The role of China in mitigating
climate change. Energy Economics, 2012. doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2012.04.007.
Z.-R. Peng. Urban Transportation Strategies in Chinese Cities and Their Impacts on the
Urban Poor. Comparative Urban Studies Program Report, Woodrow Wilson Interna-
tional Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, USA, 2004.
T. E Rutherford. Constant Elasticity of Substitution Functions: Some Hints and Useful
Formulae. Available at: http: //www. gams. com/solvers/mpsge/cesf un.htm,
December 1995.
73
T. E Rutherford. Applied General Equilibrium Modeling with MPSGE as a GAMS Sub-
system: An Overview of the Modeling Framework and Syntax. Computational Eco-
nomics, 14(1/2):1-46, 1999. doi:10.1023/A:1008655831209.
E. Saikawa, J. Kurokawa, M. Takigawa, J. Borken-Kleefeld, D. L. Mauzerall, L. W
Horowitz, and T. Ohara. The impact of China's vehicle emissions on regional air
quality in 2000 and 2020: a scenario analysis. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics,
11(18):9465-9484, 2011. doi:10.5194/acp-11-9465-2011.
R. Schwandl. UrbanRail (website). http: //www. urbanrail. net, 2012. Accessed
25 July 2012.
A. Schsfer. The global demand for motorized mobility. Transportation Research Part A:
Policy and Practice, 32(6):455-477, 1998. doi: 10.1016/SO965-8564(98)00004-4.
A. Schfer. Long-term tends in global passenger mobility. The Bridge, 36(4), 2006.
A. Schafer and D. Victor. The future mobility of the world population. Transporta-
tion Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 34(3):171, 2000. doi:10.1016/SO965-
8564(98)00071-8.
A. Schsfer, J. B. Heywood, H. D. Jacoby, and I. A. Waitz. Transportation in a Climate-
Constrained World. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2009.
D. Seligsohn. Environment as an Element of Development - the Growing Role of
Energy Efficiency and Environmental Protection in Chinese Economic Policy. In De-
velopment in Crisis: Changing the Rules in a Global World, South Hadley, MA, USA,
2012.
D. Seligsohn, M. Elliott, W Kirby, A. Kroeber, E. Osnos, E. Steinfeld, and
X. Tian. Changing, Challenging China. Harvard Magazine Roundtable tran-
script, March 2010. Available at: http: //harvardmagazine. com/2010/03/
changing- challenging- china.
Sichuan Department of Transportation. Sichuan Transport Yearbook 2011. Sichuan
Science and Technology Press, Chengdu, China, 2011. ISBN 9787536473164.
J. E. Sinton. Accuracy and reliability of China's energy statistics. China Economic
Review, 12(4):373-383, 2001. doi:10.1016/S1043-951X(01)00067-0.
E. S. Steinfeld. China Urbanizes: Consequences, Strategies, and Policies, chapter Energy
Policy, pages 125-156. Directions in Development: Countries and Regions. 6: The
World Bank, Washington, DC, USA, 2008. doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-7211-1.
A. Suen. Personal correspondence, May 2012. MAP Sustainable Energy Fellow, National
Resources Defence Council, Beijing, China.
74
Y. Sun, G. Zhaung, Y. Wang, L. Han, J. Guo, M. Dan, W Zhang, Z. Wang, and
Z. Hao. The air-borne particulate pollution in Beijing-concentration, composi-
tion, distribution and sources. Atmospheric Environment, 38(35):5991-6004, 2004.
doi:10.1016/j.atmosenv.2004.07.009.
UN Population Division. World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision. Technical
report, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, NY,
USA, October 2010. Available at: http: //esa. un. org/unpd/wpp/index .htm.
UN Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision. Technical
report, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, NY,
USA, April 2012. Available at: http: //esa.un. org/unpd/wup/index. htm.
U.S. EIA. Monthly Refinery Report. Form EIA-810, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy
Information Administration, Washington, DC, USA, July 2012. Retrieved from http:
//www. eia. gov/dnav/pet/pet_ conspsup.dcnusmbbla.htm.
M. Wang, H. Huo, L. Johnson, and D. He. Projection of Chinese Motor Vehicle Growth,
Oil Demand and CO2 Emissions Through 2050. Report ANL/ESD/06-6, Argonne
National Laboratory, Argonne, IL, USA, 12 2006.
Q. Wang, H. Huo, K. He, Z. Yao, and Q. Zhang. Characterization of vehicle driving
patterns and development of driving cycles in Chinese cities. Transportation Research
Part D, 13:289-297, 2008. doi:10.1016/j.trd.2008.03.003.
R. Wang. Shaping urban transport policies in China: Will copying foreign policies
work? Transport Policy, 17(3):147-152, 2010. doi:10.1016/j.tranpol.2010.01.001.
S. Wang, M. Zhao, J. Xing, Y. Wu, Y. Zhou, Y. Lei, K. He, L. Fu, and J. Hao. Quantifying
the Air Pollutants Emission Reduction during the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. En-
vironmental Science & Technology, 44(7):2490-2496, 2010. doi: 10.1021 /es9028167.
Y. Wang, J. Teter, and D. Sperling. China's soaring vehicle popula-
tion: Even greater than forecasted? Energy Policy, 39(6):3296, 2011.
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.03.020.
J. Weinert, C. Ma, and C. Cherry. The transition to electric bikes in China: his-
tory and key reasons for rapid growth. Transportation, 34(3):301-318, 2007.
doi:10.1007/s11116-007-9118-8.
J. Weinert, J. Ogden, D. Sperling, and A. Burke. The future of electric two-
wheelers and electric vehicles in China. Energy Policy, 36(7):2544, 2008.
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2008.03.008.
N. Winchester, C. Wollersheim, R. Clewlow, N. Jost, S. Paltsev, J. Reilly, and I. Waitz.
The Impact of Climate Policy on U.S. Aviation. Report 198, MIT Joint Program on
the Science and Policy of Global Change, Cambridge, MA, USA, April 2011.
75
Y Wu, R. Wang, Y. Zhou, B. Lin, L. Fu, K. He, and J. Hao. On-Road Vehicle Emission
Control in Beijing: Past, Present, and Future. Environmental Science & Technology,
45(1):147-153, 2011. doi:10.1021/es1014289.
L. Xi, L. Lei, and W Guisheng. Evolution of the Chinese Automobile Industry from a
Sectoral System of Innovation Perspective. Industry & Innovation, 16(4-5):463-478,
2009. doi:10.1080/13662710903053755.
D. Xin, X. Wang, and Y. Shi. "Experts fear subway costs could go off the rails," China
Daily, 31 July 2012. Available at: http: //usa. chinadaily. com. cn/business/
2012-07/31/content_15634587.htm, July 2012. Accessed 06 August 2012.
Z. Xin. "New fuel standards to cut pollution in city," China Daily, 18 May
2012. Available at: http: //www. chinadaily. com. cn/china/2012-05/18/
content_15325468. htm, May 2012. Accessed 01 August 2012.
Xinhua News Agency. "China's imported oil dependence continues to rise", 10 May
2012, 2012. Available at: http: //news. xinhuanet. com/english/china/
2012-05/10/c131580559.htm.
T. Yasunori. Personal correspondence, May 2012. Project General Manager, Regulation
Certification and Technical Affairs Division, Toyota Motor Engineering and Manufac-
turing (China).
J. Yin, Z. Yin, H. Zhong, S. Xu, X. Hu, J. Wang, and J. Wu. Monitoring urban expansion
and land use/land cover changes of Shanghai metropolitan area during the transi-
tional economy (1979-2009) in China. Environmental Monitoring and Assessment,
177:609-621, 2011. doi:10.1007/s10661-010-1660-8.
Y. Yuan and S. Lou. Research on Urban Rail Transit Financing Operation Modes. In
18th International Conference on Management Science & Engineering, pages 1174-9,
Rome, Italy, 2011.
J. Zeng. "Guangzhou's car quota hurts more than helps industry," China Daily, 06
August 2012. Available at: http: //www. chinadaily. com. cn/cndy/2012-08/
06/content_15645892. htm, August 2012. Accessed 06 August 2012.
D. Zhang, S. Rausch, V Karplus, T. Qi, and X. Zhang. Regional impact of emission
reduction target allocation in China. In EcoMod Conference 2012, Seville, Spain,
2012.
Q. Zhang and D. Yang. "City to spend 48b yuan on 3 Metro lines," Shenzhen Daily,
28 June 2012, June 2012. Available at: http: //szdaily. sznews. com/html/
2012-06/28/content_2103092.htm.
76
